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Norm Manipulation, Norm Evasion: Experimental Evidence
Cristina Bicchieri and Alex K. Chavez
University of Pennsylvania

Abstract. Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two
phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an
interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the
deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a
norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what
constituted normatively acceptable behavior, so that an individual who made an
uneven bargaining offer not only genuinely believed it was fair, but also believed
that recipients found it fair, even though recipients of the offer considered it to be
unfair. In contrast, norm evasion operated as a highly explicit process. When they
could do so without the recipient’s knowledge, individuals made uneven offers
despite knowing that their behavior was unfair.
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Introduction
Multiple interpretations of a social norm often exist. For example, there is a social
norm of leaving 15-20% of the bill in gratuity when dining in the United States, as
long as service was at least adequate. Norm manipulation is the selection of the
interpretation of a norm that best suits an individual (Bicchieri, 2006; Bicchieri &
Chavez, 2010) – in this case, leaving 15% instead of 20%. Bicchieri & Chavez
(2010) hypothesized that individuals are prone to a self-serving bias in that they
adopt beliefs that justify their manipulation of a norm.. Self-serving biases are
common, and are often rationalized as justifiable by the involved party (Messick
and Sentis 1983; Babcock et al. 1995; Konow 2000; Epley and Caruso 2004;
Bicchieri and Mercier 2012). A considerable psychological literature in motivated
reasoning shows that people have minimal standards when it comes to selfjustifications: not every behavior can be adequately rationalized (Kunda, 1990;
Mercier & Sperber, 2011). One way to justify a self-serving interpretation of a norm
is to hold a second-order belief that supports it, i.e. a belief that other parties would
find that interpretation acceptable and endorse it.

We explore this hypothesis

empirically by measuring first and second-order beliefs of two parties whose
monetary interests in a bargaining situation were not aligned.
Related to norm manipulation is norm evasion – the deliberate, private
violation of a norm.1 When information is private to one or more parties, there is the
temptation to use this information to one’s advantage, avoiding norm-abiding
behavior. Consider a person who wants to buy a much-coveted ticket. He knows
there will be a long line, and those at the end of the line may find that all tickets have
been sold. He could try to arrive very early, but instead he decides to take it easy
1

We reserve the term “norm transgression” to the open and public flaunting of a social norm such as, for example,
cutting a line with no justification, or refusing to contribute to the Christmas’ present to the department secretaries
when it is public knowledge that no hardship has befallen the non-contributor.
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and arrive with a fake bandage on his foot and a cane. He expects people to allow
him to go first, as waiting in line would cause him unnecessary hardship. His
private information serves him well, as he can cut the line with impunity2. This is
admittedly an extreme case of norm evasion, but less wacky occurrences are far
more frequent (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). We directly tested for norm evasion
by measuring whether individuals chose uneven monetary splits in a bargaining
game, despite believing that it was normatively unacceptable and that others
believed the same.
Measuring second-order beliefs presents several advantages.

On the one

hand, mutually consistent second-order normative beliefs suggest that a norm is
present. This occurs when most people believe that most people think one should
behave in a particular way. On the other hand, measuring second-order beliefs
allows us to discriminate among types of players, and predict under which
conditions we might expect norm compliance.

For example, a player who

consistently chooses an equal share in an Ultimatum game may be deemed to be
generous, but what if that player believes that only an equal share will be acceptable
to her opponent, whereas she also believes that less generous shares are perfectly
fair? Such a player may be expected to rationally choose a much less equitable share
if the situation allows her to do so with impunity. To explore the possibility of such
differences in beliefs and motives, we focus on multivariate techniques that can
identify heterogeneity across individuals.

2

Old comic Italian movies often depict a scoundrel (the actor Toto`) who regularly engages in such antisocial behaviors.
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Background
Tipping in the United States, not cutting in front of others who are waiting in
line, and paying for dinner or splitting the bill are all examples of social norms. They
are not universally followed rules (leaving a gratuity in Japan is not considered
appropriate), nor are they unconditionally followed rules (if enough people are
disregarding the long queue for the highway exit, one might be inclined to cut to the
front as well). A social norm may be formally defined as a behavioral rule such that
sufficiently many people know it exists and prefer to follow it under the condition that
they believe that sufficiently many others will (a) also conform to the rule (empirical
expectation) and b) expect them to follow the rule and may be willing to sanction
deviations from it (normative expectation) (Bicchieri, 2006, p.11). 3 This definition
implies that a norm may exist and not always be followed, since individuals may not
have the appropriate empirical and/or normative expectations. It is also the case that
different individuals may have different sensitivities to a given norm. For a player
who does not care much about a norm, the expectation of negative sanctions will be
necessary to induce conformity and if transgressions are difficult to detect, some
people will be tempted to evade a norm. In ambiguous situations in which more than
one norm may apply, or different ‘interpretations’ of a norm may be available, selfserving biases may induce individuals to discount a norm in favor of another that they
prefer (Xiao and Bicchieri 2010) or to choose an interpretation that favors them. For
example, when ‘fair’ divisions can be interpreted according to equality or equity rules
(Van Avermaet 1974; Messick and Sentis 1983; Konow 2000), individual preferences
over outcomes tend to determine the interpretation of fairness one adopts. In this
case, it looks as if individuals ‘choose’ what to believe. Eliciting second-order beliefs
3

Note that normative expectations are second-order beliefs about what others believe one ought to do, and thus differ
from second-order empirical expectations (what others expect one to do), as well as from first-order normative beliefs
(what one thinks he ought to do.)
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would show that individuals also attribute to others the kind of beliefs that justify their
own choices.
To test the hypothesis that norm manipulation and norm evasion are two very
different phenomena, we focused on a version of the Ultimatum Game (Guth,
Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) in which Proposers proposed a division of a sum
of $10.00 to Responders, who accepted or rejected the offer. In the case of a
rejection, both parties got nothing. On average, Proposers make offers that are 4050% of the total amount, and Responders reject offers below 20% about half of the
time (Camerer, 2003). This suggests that there is a shared norm of fairness as
(roughly) equal division in the standard Ultimatum Game. However, subtle
manipulations of the Ultimatum Game can create multiple interpretations of what
constitutes fair behavior. For example, instead of specifying that each party earns
nothing if the Responder rejects, Knez & Camerer (1995) assigned payoffs of $3.00
to the Proposer and $2.00 to the Responder in case of rejection. Under the
interpretation of fairness as equality in payoffs, offers of $5.00 are fair. However,
because the Responder can earn $2.00 by rejecting, another interpretation of fairness
is equal division of the surplus above the outside offers. In this case the Proposer’s
offer of (5.50, 4.50) equalizes the difference between received and foregone payoff
(5.50 – 3 = 2.50, and 4.50 – 2 = 2.50). Whereas average rejection rates typically are
5-25%, in the study of Knez & Camerer (1995) rejection rates were close to 50%.
They interpret their results by suggesting that Proposers and Responders adopted
self-serving beliefs about what constituted a fair offer.

Yet since they were

comparing rejection rates in a game with two focal divisions to those in a game with
only one focal division, their conclusion that a self-serving bias is at work is not
necessarily warranted. Assessing Proposers’ and Responders’ first and second-order
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beliefs about fair divisions would have provided a better assessment of the presence
of self-serving interpretations of fairness.
Kagel, Kim, & Moser (1996) asked Proposers and Responders to bargain over
100 chips which were worth three times as much for one of the players ($0.30 vs.
$0.10 per chip). When chips were worth more for Proposers, and this was common
knowledge, both Proposers and Responders adopted self-serving fairness beliefs:
Proposers offered slightly more than half the chips, which was an offer of only 1/4th
of the money (instead of 75% of the chips, which would be an offer of half the
money), and Responders rejected roughly half the time. Clearly Proposers wanted to
offer a fair share of the chips, whereas Responders thought they should get a fair
share of dollars.
Although the authors of these studies inferred that individuals adopted selfserving interpretations about what constituted fair behavior, they did not directly
measure fairness beliefs, and instead based their inferences on behavior alone. At
least two mechanisms could give rise to such behavior. On the one hand, Proposers
might genuinely believe that uneven monetary splits are fair. On the other hand,
Proposers might believe that uneven monetary splits are unfair, but believe that
Responders believe that such splits are fair. Uneven offer behavior is consistent with
either explanation, but the psychological mechanisms underlying these two
explanations are different. In the first case, a self-serving bias leads Proposers to
consider uneven splits to be fair. Given that both even and uneven splits are thought
to be fair, Proposers choose the one that yields a higher payoff. This seems to occur
in the Knez and Camerer experiment, as well as in the Kagel et al. experiment when
players had common knowledge of the different monetary conversion values. In the
second case, Proposers suffer no self-serving bias, and knowingly make an unfair
offer because Responders lack full information. An example of such patently unfair
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behavior occurs in the Kagel et al. (1996) experiment. When only Proposers knew
that the chips were worth three times as much for them, they offered, on average,
only half of the chips. In this case, rejections were low (and likely expected to be
low). Had Proposers been fair, they should have offered ¾ of the chips to
Responders.
To distinguish between these possibilities, we extended the design of
Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) which used an Ultimatum Game variant to a) allow
multiple interpretations of what constituted a fair offer and b) create informational
asymmetries between Proposers and Responders. Whereas that study did not
measure Proposers’ first-order fairness beliefs, making it impossible to determine
whether norm manipulation or norm evasion occurred, the present study measured
both Proposers’ and Responders’ first and second-order fairness beliefs, allowing us
to directly assess the presence of norm manipulation and norm evasion.

Methods
Participants. 64 college-age participants took part in our study across 6 experimental
sessions. Advertisements specified that participants would earn 5 USD in addition to
an amount that would depend on decisions made during the experiment.
Game Paradigm. Our experimental design employed a variant of the Ultimatum
Game in which one participant, the Proposer, provisionally received a sum of 10
USD – provided by the experimenter – and then proposed a division of that money
to an anonymous Responder. The Responder subsequently decided to accept or
reject the proposal. If the Responder accepted, both players received the amounts
specified in the proposal. If the Responder rejected, both players received $0. The
Proposer chose from one of the following options:
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(5,5) – to propose $5 for the Proposer and $5 for the Responder;
(8,2) – to propose $8 for the Proposer and $2 for the Responder;
Coin – to let the outcome of a fair coin flip determine the proposal: Heads
corresponded to (5,5) and tails to (8,2).

Procedure. An experimenter randomized participants into one of two rooms upon
their arrival, which determined whether they would be a Proposer or a Responder for
the duration of the study. We distributed and read aloud instructions that explained
the Ultimatum Game, that participants would play three such games with a different
person chosen at random in the other room, that all choices and responses were
strictly anonymous, and that participants would be paid in cash at the end of the
experimental session for two of the three games chosen at random. Before each
game, an experimenter provided additional written instructions to participants and
read them aloud. Participants also took a short quiz to ensure that they understood
these instructions. After completing the quiz, but prior to making or receiving a
proposal, Proposers and Responders completed questionnaires that measured their
empirical expectations and first- and second-order fairness beliefs (normative
expectations). Finally, Proposers completed proposal forms and Responders
responded to them. The full set of instructions and proposal forms can be found in
Online Appendices A and B.
Fairness Beliefs and Empirical Expectations. Online Appendices C and D show the
questionnaires that were used to measure Proposers’ and Responders’ empirical
expectations and first- and second-order fairness beliefs (normative expectations).
Table 3 also provides a condensed listing of the questions. Items regarding the Coin
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option were omitted in the private condition, as Responders did not know that the
Coin option was available in that condition, and Proposers understood this.
The questionnaires allowed us to measure whether each Proposer considered
each choice option to be fair by condition, Proposers’ beliefs about Responders’ and
other Proposers’ fairness beliefs, Proposers’ beliefs about Responders’ behavior
conditional on each offer, and various Responders’ beliefs. These belief variables
allowed us investigate the presence of norm manipulation, norm evasion, and which
beliefs were most relevant to Proposers’ choices.
Information Condition. Participants played three Ultimatum Games under different
information conditions in a fixed-order, within-subjects design. In the full
information condition, Proposers marked on a proposal form whether their choice
was (5,5), (8,2), or Coin. Subsequently, the experimenter in the room of Responders
publically flipped a coin. On any forms on which the Proposer chose Coin, the
experimenter marked (5,5) or (8,2), based on the coin flip outcome. Thus, all
participants understood that the Coin option was available and that Responders
would know if the Proposer with whom they were paired chose Coin.
In the private information condition, Responders did not know that Coin was
available to Proposers, and Proposers were aware of this fact. To create this
informational asymmetry, we left Coin off of the proposal form, but allowed
Proposers to choose Coin by leaving the remaining options ((5,5) and (8,2))
unmarked on the form. An experimenter in the room of Proposers then flipped a
coin. On any forms on which the Proposer chose Coin, the experimenter marked
(5,5) or (8,2), based on the coin flip outcome. Thus, Responders only saw a form
with either (5,5) or (8,2) marked, and were unaware of the existence of the Coin
option.
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In the limited information condition, all participants knew that the Coin option
was available, but that the Responder would not be able to distinguish whether the
Proposer chose (5,5) or (8,2) directly, or chose Coin whose outcome was (5,5) or
(8,2). To create this information condition, we listed (5,5), (8,2), and Coin on the
proposal form, but instructed all participants that Proposers could only choose Coin
by leaving all options unmarked. After Proposers made their choices, the
experimenter in the room of Responders privately flipped a coin. On any forms on
which the Proposer chose Coin, the experimenter marked (5,5) or (8,2), based on the
coin flip outcome.
We fixed the order of conditions as 1) full, 2) private, and 3) limited because a
different ordering led to confusion in pilot studies. Because we did not provide
Proposers with feedback between conditions, and because participants only played
three games, we expected any effects of learning without feedback (Weber, 2003) to
be minimal.

Results
Testing hypotheses about individual motives for action requires that we
assume there is consistency between individual beliefs and behavior. This is
especially important when beliefs refer to other players’ beliefs and behavior, since
one’s choices in strategic situations are conditional on those beliefs. It is a basic
practical rationality assumption that cannot be abandoned if we want to retain
predictability. 4 In what follows we shall examine two main hypotheses about

4

By practical rationality we mean the rationality of an action, given a player’s beliefs. Beliefs may be crazy (i.e.,
epistemically irrational), but as long as an individual acts according to her beliefs she is practically rational.
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motives: Profit maximization and social norms. Analysis of belief-choice pairs
consistency provides support for the latter hypothesis only.
Common Knowledge of Profit Maximization Hypothesis. We begin by testing the
basic hypothesis that participants only care about their monetary payoffs. This
hypothesis is usually accompanied by an assumption of risk neutrality, and in what
follows we shall assume risk neutrality throughout. Under the assumptions that
participants sought to maximize their individual monetary gains and that this was
common knowledge:
1)

No Responder should ever reject any of the three possible offers, because

accepting any offer yields a positive payoff and rejecting yields a payoff of $0.00,
2)

Proposers should therefore:

a.

Always believe that Responders will accept any positive offer,

b.

Always propose (8,2), because conditional on the Responder accepting, (8,2)

maximizes the Proposer’s payoff.
As Table 1 shows, respectively in the full, private, and limited information
conditions, Responders rejected (8,2) offers 1 of 4 times (25%), 4 of 11 times (36%),
and 5 of 16 times (31%), contrary to the first prediction. Moreover, as Table 2
shows, between 15 of 31 (48%) and 25 of 32 (78%) of Proposers, depending on the
condition, believed that fewer than half of Responders would accept (8,2), contrary
to prediction 2a. Finally, as Figure 1 shows, between 16 of 32 (50%) and 28 of 32
(88%) of Proposers, depending on the condition, did not choose (8,2), contrary to
prediction 2b. Thus, as expected, there was strong evidence against the hypothesis of
common knowledge of profit maximization.

[Table 1 here]
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Profit Maximization Without Common Knowledge Hypothesis. It was possible that
Proposers sought to maximize their monetary gains, but did not know whether
Responders would do the same. According to this hypothesis, Proposers who are risk
neutral would make an offer that yielded the highest expected value based on their
beliefs about Responder behavior. Although we did not measure Proposers’ exact
probabilistic beliefs of whether the Responder would accept a particular offer, we
recorded whether each Proposer believed the majority of Responders would accept a
particular offer. Table 2 tabulates these responses.

[Table 2 here]
Because 100% of Proposers believed the majority of Responders would accept (5,5),
regardless of the information condition or offer source, the expected value of (5,5)
was $5.00. It follows that a profit-maximizing Proposer who believed half or fewer
than half of Responders would accept (8,2) would never propose (8,2), because the
expected value of choosing (8,2) was at most $4.00. Such Proposers would also
never choose Coin, because E[Coin] = $2.50 + $4.00q ≤ $4.50, where q ≤ .5 is the
Proposer’s unmeasured belief about the proportion of Responders who would accept
(8,2). Thus, we predicted that no Proposer would choose (8,2) or Coin if they
believed half or fewer than half of Responders would accept (8,2).
Contrary to this prediction, of the Proposers who believed half or fewer of
Responder would accept (8,2), 3 of 15 proposed (8,2) in the private condition, 3 of 9
proposed (8,2) in the limited condition, 1 of 7 proposed Coin in the full condition,
and 2 of 9 proposed Coin in the limited condition. The non-zero proportion of
Proposers who chose (8,2) or Coin implies inconsistent belief-choice pairs among at
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least some subjects under the profit maximization hypothesis, providing evidence
against this hypothesis.
Finally, of the choices of the remaining Proposers – those who believed the
majority of Responders would accept (8,2) – 20 of 96 (21%) were Coin. According
to the (risk neutral) profit maximization hypothesis, however, such Proposers should
never strictly prefer coin, because when q > 5/8, choosing (8,2) uniquely maximizes
expected value, whereas when q < 5/8, choosing (5,5) uniquely maximizes expected
value. 5 In sum, there was substantial evidence that Proposers did not simply
maximize expected value conditional on their beliefs about Responder behavior.
Social Norms Hypothesis. Theories of monetary gains maximization were not
sufficient to explain participants’ behavior. Moreover, profit maximization theories
are agnostic as to why Proposers’ beliefs and behavior varied across information
conditions, even when monetary consequences were held fixed. The theory of social
norms we adopt predicted that participants would be focused on different fairness
norms when we manipulated their first- and second-order fairness beliefs defined,
respectively, as 1) which offers they considered fair, and 2) which offers they
believed others considered fair. Before analyzing the belief data, however, we first
tested our primary hypotheses concerning behavior by analyzing the distribution of
offers across information condition.
Predictions about Frequencies of Behavior by Condition. In the full information
condition, because information about the coin flip was complete (whether the
Proposer chose to flip a coin and the outcome of the coin flip were both public
knowledge) and normative expectations for coin were present6, we expected more

5

When q = 5/8, the Proposer is indifferent amongst the three choices, and one might argue that such Proposers chose
Coin; however, such an explanation places an unreasonable prior distribution on q.
6
In the full information condition, Proposers believed that 76% of Responders considered Coin to be fair (see Table 3).
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coin choices in this condition relative to the others. In the limited information
condition, because Proposers could take advantage of the ambiguity created by the
opacity of the offer source (an offer of (8,2) could have been generated by a Coin
choice, and the Responder could not determine whether the Proposer chose coin), we
expected the highest frequency of (8,2) choices. Finally, Proposers essentially faced
a choice between (5,5) and (8,2) in the private condition, as the Coin choice was not
known to Responders, and thus there were no normative expectations to choose
Coin; we therefore expected the highest frequency of (5,5) choices in this condition.
Figure 1 shows aggregated offer proportions by condition. Fisher’s exact test
rejected the null hypothesis of no association between offer and condition (p =
.0012). The hypothesis that (5,5) offers were more likely in the private condition
than the other conditions was not supported by Fisher’s one-sided exact test (OR =
1.64, p = .1739). However, (8,2) was more likely in the limited condition than in the
other conditions (OR = 2.85, p = .0187), and Coin was more likely to be selected in
the full condition than in the other conditions (OR = 7.34, p = .0002), as expected.
Planned follow-up permutation tests7 (p-values uncorrected) revealed that the effect
of (8,2) in the limited condition was attributable to a difference from the full
condition (OR = 6.18, p < .0001) but not the private condition (OR = 1.68, p =
.1331). On the other hand, the effect of Coin in the full condition was attributable to
a difference from the limited condition (OR = 7.52, p = .0080) or the private
condition (OR = 7.52, p = .0080).
Therefore, we found support for two of our three primary hypotheses,
reproducing the basic findings of Bicchieri and Chavez (2010). Whereas the
proportion of (5,5) offers stayed constant across conditions, (8,2) was more likely in
7

Directional hypotheses such as πCoin|Full > πCoin|Private (where πi|j = Pr(Choice=i | Condition=j)) can be tested using permutation
tests which are exact up to randomization error and respect the dependence of the within-participants design.
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the limited condition, in which Proposers could take advantage of the ambiguity of
the source of their offer, and Coin was more likely in the full condition, in which
Proposers could not ignore normative expectations to make a fair offer, and their
second-order beliefs (normative expectations) about Responders indicated Coin was
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0.3

2
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0.5

5

15
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+/- One Bootstrap SE
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believed to be fair by a large majority of Responders.

Full

Figure 1. Proportions/counts of (5,5), (8,2), and Coin choices (indexed by lines
labeled 5, 2, and C) by condition. N = 32 for each condition.

Fairness Beliefs. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the 19 variables that
comprised the Proposers’ belief data, and the 19 variables that comprised the
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Responders’ belief data. We omitted most belief variables involving (5,5), as
participants universally considered (5,5) to be fair and believed that (5,5) would be
accepted by the majority of Responders.
Responders’ beliefs about the proportions of Proposers who would choose
(5,5), (8,2), and Coin were largely insensitive to experimentally created
informational asymmetries, as indicated by the constancy of expected proportions of
(8,2) and Coin choices across information conditions. Responders believed,
however, that there would be a dramatic increase in the proportion of (5,5) choices
in the private condition, although they expected the proportion of (8,2) choices to
stay the same as in the full and limited information conditions. Thus, they believed
that a stable fraction of Proposers would choose Coin when it was an available
option, but would instead choose (5,5) when it was unavailable; that is, Responders
believed Proposers had a conditional preference for choosing Coin.

[Table 3 here]

Norm Manipulation. Both Proposers and Responders generally considered (8,2) to
be unfair, and believed that others considered it to be unfair. The proportion of
Proposers who considered (8,2) to be fair did not differ from the proportion of
Responders who considered it to be fair (χ2(1) = 1.90, p = .17, in the full condition;
χ2(1) = 0.00 in the private condition; and χ2(1) = 0.87, p = .35, in the limited
condition). However, more Proposers than Responders considered Coin to be fair,
both in the full information condition (81% vs. 52%, χ2(1) = 6.93, p = .0085) and in
the limited information condition (72% vs. 43%, χ2(1) = 6.35, p = .0117). Secondorder beliefs about the fairness of Coin exhibited the same pattern; in the full

17

information condition, Proposers believed 76% of Responders considered Coin fair,
whereas Responders believed only 46% of Responders considered Coin fair (t(61) =
3.70, p < .001), and in the limited information condition, the respective figures were
62% and 39% (t(62) = 2.46, p = .0168). Thus, when multiple interpretations of a
social norm were available (many Responders believed that Coin, in addition to
(5,5), was fair), Proposers exhibited a self-serving bias in both first- and secondorder beliefs about the fairness of Coin. Under an alternative theory of self-serving
norm manipulation, individuals who offered Coin could have believed that Coin was
unfair, but that Responders considered it to be fair. However, 11 of the 14 Proposers
who chose Coin in the full information condition believed that Coin was fair. Thus,
taken together, these findings provided evidence of a particular brand of norm
manipulation, in which individuals adopted an interpretation of a norm that best
suited them, while simultaneously exhibiting self-serving biases in their first- and
second-order beliefs about the normative acceptability of that interpretation.8
Norm Evasion. We hypothesized that Proposers who chose (8,2) in the limited
information condition did so despite believing that (8,2) was unfair, and despite
believing that most Responders and other Proposers considered (8,2) to be unfair. In
the limited condition, because Responders could not distinguish between 1) a choice
of (8,2), and 2) a Coin choice that resulted in an offer of (8,2), Proposers could
deliberately ignore normative expectations. By measuring Proposers’ fairness
beliefs, we were able to directly test for the presence of norm evasion. 11 of the 15
Proposers who chose (8,2) in the limited condition believed that (8,2) was not fair.
Moreover, Proposers who chose (8,2) in the limited condition believed on average
that only 34% of other Proposers and 21% of Responders thought (8,2) was fair.

8

Similar observations about self-serving interpretations of norms in Trust games (equality versus reciprocity) were
made by Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) and Bicchieri and Mercier (2012).
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Thus, we found direct evidence that Proposers intentionally ignored normative
expectations in the limited condition in order to evade a norm of fairness.
Structure of Fairness Beliefs. To explore the heterogeneity in Proposers’ beliefs, we
subjected the 19 variables comprising the Proposers’ belief data to an exploratory
factor analysis. We selected a four-factor solution based on tests successive
significance tests at the alpha = .05 level (oblimin rotated). 9
Table 4 shows the resulting factor solution. The pattern of loadings led to four
clearly interpretable factors with a simple structure. Factor 1 loaded on Proposers’
first- and second-order beliefs about the fairness of (8,2). Proposers with high scores
on Factor 1 believed that (8,2) was fair across conditions, and that other Proposers
and Responders also believed (8,2) was fair. Factors 2 and 4 loaded on beliefs about
the fairness of Coin in, respectively, the limited information condition and the full
information condition. Proposers with higher scores on Factor 2 believed that Coin
was fair in the limited information condition, and that other Proposers and
Responders believed the same; those with higher scores on Factor 4 had analogous
beliefs about the fairness of Coin in the full information condition. Finally, Factor 3
loaded on beliefs about whether the majority of Responders would accept (8,2).
Thus, Factors 1, 2, and 4 represented Proposers’ first- and second-order normative
beliefs about (8,2) and Coin, whereas Factor 3 represented profit-maximizing
considerations.

[Table 4 here]
9

This method of assessing factorial dimensionality, introduced by Horn (1965), has been shown in simulation studies
(Zwick & Velicer, 1986) to be more effective at identifying the true number of factors than either the observed rootone rule (Kaiser, 1960) or the scree plot (Cattell, 1966), in some circumstances by large margins (e.g., 92% accuracy
for the present method vs. 22% accuracy for the root-one rule).
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Fairness Beliefs as Predictors of Behavior.
To investigate whether beliefs predicted choices, we entered standardized regression
factor scores (Thurstone, 1935) into multinomial logit models of choices, and used
AIC-based stepwise variable selection to find a set of informative factors. 10 Table 5
shows the logit estimates of the resulting models, and Figures 2-4 plot the
corresponding predicted choice probabilities by factor scores.
In the full information condition, the two factors retained had qualitatively
similar effects on choice probabilities. For Proposers with extremely low scores on
Factor 1 or Factor 3 – respectively reflecting the belief that (8,2) was unfair and that
others agreed and the belief that Responders would reject (8,2) – the probability of
choosing (8,2) was very low, and the probability of choosing (5,5) was highest (see
Figure 2). As scores on Factors 1 or 3 increased from extremely low to extremely
high values, the probability of (5,5) monotonically declined, whereas the probability
of (8,2) monotonically increased, with the two options being equiprobable at
respective factor scores of two standard deviations above the mean for Factor 1 and
one standard deviation above the mean for Factor 3. The probability of choosing
Coin, on the other hand, exhibited an inverted-U shaped curve as factor scores
increased from extremely low to extremely high values, reaching a maximum
probability of roughly .55 - .65 when the factor score was half a standard deviation
above the mean. That Factors 1 and 3 were informative predictors of choice in a
simultaneous regression model strongly supported the social norms hypothesis, as

10

For the Private condition, we used a binomial model to estimate the log-odds of (8,2) vs. (5,5), as there were only
three Coin choices.
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empirical and normative expectations predicted choice in the expected directions,
even when controlling for the effects of profit-maximizing considerations.
In the private information condition, the predicted probability of the Proposer
choosing (5,5) monotonically decreased as Factor 1 scores or Factor 4 scores
increased (see Figure 3). Slightly above the mean score for Factor 1, and one
standard deviation above the mean score for Factor 4, (5,5) and (8,2) were
equiprobable. To reiterate, Factors 1 and 4 – which reflected beliefs that (8,2) overall
and Coin in the full condition were fair and considered fair by others – were more
informative predictors of choice than Factor 3, which reflected beliefs about the
likelihood of (8,2) being accepted. This finding further supported the social norms
hypothesis. Firstly, empirical and normative expectations were more predictive of
choice than profit-maximizing considerations. Secondly, the effect of Factor 4
suggested that only Proposers who were sensitive to social norms – i.e., those who
believed Coin was empirically and normatively acceptable in the full information
condition – chose (8,2) over (5,5) in the private condition; those who chose (5,5)
over (8,2) in the private condition held first- and second-order beliefs that Coin was
not fair in the full information condition. We return to this issue of patterns of
choices across conditions in subsequent analyses.
Finally, in the limited information condition, as Factor 3 scores increased, the
predicted probability of the Proposer choosing (5,5) monotonically declined,
whereas the probability of (8,2) monotonically increased (see Figure 4). Profitmaximizing motives therefore appeared to dominate in this condition, as Proposers
knew that Responders could not distinguish between a choice of (8,2) and a choice
of Coin which resulted in an offer of (8,2). In fact, only 48.3% and 53.1% of
Proposers believed the majority of Responders would accept (8,2) in the full and
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private information conditions, respectively, but 71.0% believed the majority of
Responders would accept (8,2) in the limited condition.

[Table 5 here]

1.0

Coin

0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

(8,2)

0.8

(5,5)

Full Information Condition
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Full Information Condition
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Factor 1: Fairness of (8,2)

2
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-3
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1
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Factor 3: Profit-Maximization

Figure 2. Predicted choice probabilities in the full information condition, by Factors
1 and 2, based on the model in Table 5. To compute the predicted probability as a
function of Factor 1 (left graph), the value of Factor 3 was held fixed at its mean.
Analogously, the value of Factor 1 was held fixed at its mean in the right graph.
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Figure 3. Predicted choice probabilities in the private information condition by
Factors 1 and 4, based on the model in Table 5. To compute the predicted
probability as a function of Factor 1 (left graph), the value of Factor 4 was held fixed
at its mean. Analogously, the value of Factor 1 was held fixed at its mean in the right
graph.
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Figure 4. Predicted choice probabilities in the limited information condition by
Factor 3.

Patterns of Proposers’ Choices Across Conditions. We expected different patterns
of correlated choices across conditions, with some choice patterns corresponding to
Proposers who were sensitive to social norms of fairness, and other choice patterns
corresponding to expected value maximization. According to the social norms
hypothesis, in the full information condition, norm-following Proposers should
choose Coin because they believed that the majority of Responders and Proposers
considered Coin to be fair (see Table 3), whereas expected value maximizers should
choose (5,5) or (8,2) based on their expected values. Because normative expectations
for Coin were absent in the private information condition, both types should choose
(5,5) or (8,2) based on their expected values, with the constraint that expected value
maximizers should make the same choice in the full information condition, as their
preferences are, by definition, insensitive to normative expectations. In the limited
information condition, normative expectations for Coin were present (see Table 3),
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but norm conformity could not be assessed by Responders due to the opacity of the
offer source (a direct choice or the result of a coin flip). Thus, either (5,5) or (8,2)
could be expected, with the constraint that any Proposer who chose (8,2) in the full
or private conditions should choose (8,2) in the limited condition as well, as the
probability of (8,2) being rejected in the latter condition is, ceteris paribus, lower
than in the former conditions. To summarize, of the 27 possible patterns of choices
across conditions, we expected to observe the following 6 patterns: Coin-(5,5)-(8,2),
Coin-(8,2)-(8,2), Coin-(5,5)-(5,5), (5,5)-(5,5)-(5,5), (5,5)-(5,5)-(8,2), and (8,2)-(8,2)(8,2).
Table 6 tabulates observed offer patterns across conditions. 24 of the 32
observed patterns were contained in the list of expected patterns generated by the
social norms hypothesis. The only offer pattern on our list of expected patterns for
which there were no observations was (5,5)-(5,5)-(8,2). For the remaining observed
offer patterns, the Proposer offered Coin in either the private or limited condition,
with the exception of the pattern (8,2)-(8,2)-(5,5). On the whole, the observed
patterns were consistent with predictions based on a theory of social norms.

[Table 6 here]

Conclusion
Basic theories of profit maximization were inadequate in explaining
Proposers’ behavior, and did not provide an explanation for differences in beliefs or
choice frequencies across information conditions. A theory of social norms
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predicted, however, that participants would be focused on different fairness norms
when we manipulated their first- and second-order fairness beliefs and that their
behavior would vary accordingly. We replicated the basic findings of Bicchieri &
Chavez (2010) by showing that the frequency of (8,2) was highest in the limited
condition, in which Proposers could take advantage of the opacity of the source of
their offer, and that the frequency of Coin was highest in the full information
condition, in which Proposers could not ignore normative expectations to make a
fair offer. Proposers’ beliefs varied in informative ways, revealing that the fairness
of (8,2) and Coin and beliefs about whether (8,2) would be accepted were important
directions of variation, and moreover, that they jointly explained choices. Choice
patterns across conditions also followed patterns that were predicted by a theory of
social norms, and individuals could be separated into two classes based on their
choice patterns: those who generally offered (5,5) and believed (8,2) was unfair and
unlikely to be accepted, and those who offered Coin or (8,2) whenever their
likelihood of acceptance was high and who believed (8,2) was generally fair and
likely to be accepted.
By measuring Proposers’ beliefs about the fairness of each option and their
beliefs about whether others considered each option to be fair, we were able to
directly assess the presence and type of norm manipulation. In the full information
condition, Proposers adopted an interpretation of the norm that best suited them by
offering Coin. Under one theory of norm manipulation, Proposers could have
considered Coin to be unfair but believed that Responders considered it to be fair.
However, this was not the case; Proposers both believed Coin was fair and believed
that others considered it fair. Moreover, Proposers exhibited self-serving biases in
their beliefs when compared to Responders. Thus, in our data, norm manipulation
did not operate as an explicit, calculating process in which individuals assessed

26

whether others viewed each option as normatively acceptable, and then selected the
one that best suited them. Instead, it operated as an implicit process in which
individuals’ self-serving biases in assessing the normative acceptability of different
options drove behavior, consistent with the interpretations of Knez & Camerer
(1995) of their behavioral data.
We also found direct evidence consistent with the presence of norm evasion –
the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. Despite their beliefs that (8,2) was
unfair and was considered unfair by others in the limited condition, Proposers chose
(8,2). Because Proposers’ choices were private, they intentionally ignored normative
expectations in order to evade a norm of fairness with impunity.
To conclude, we directly measured first and second-order fairness beliefs in
bargaining games to understand norm manipulation and norm evasion, and add to
previous behavioral studies that did not measure beliefs. In the study of Kagel et al.
(1996) discussed in the Background, Proposers made even chip splits (uneven
monetary splits) when both Proposers and Responders knew chip values. But in a
separate condition in which only Proposers knew the chip values, Proposers also
offered roughly even chip splits. Based on our findings, we hypothesize that
Proposers’ beliefs were very different in these two conditions. In the first, it is likely
that Proposers considered even chip splits to be fair as the result of a self-serving
bias, as the authors infer. In the second, however, Proposers likely suffered no such
self-serving bias, and instead simply believed that they were “getting away” with
unfair behavior due to the informational asymmetry. Thus, norm manipulation and
norm evasion are similar phenomena in their lack of norm conformity, but differ
greatly in their psychological motivations. Norm manipulation is characterized by
genuine, self-serving beliefs, as opposed to deliberate, calculated violations of a
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norm when multiple interpretations are available. Norm evasion, on the other hand,
is characterized by the deliberate violation of a norm when information is private.
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Table 1
Rejection behavior by offer, information condition, and offer source (Coin or choice)

Information Condition / Source
Full
From Coin
From choice
Private
Limited

Offer
(5,5)
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

(8,2)
0/12
0/14
0/21
0/16

0.0%
25.0%
36.4%
31.3%

0/2
1/4
4/11
5/16

Table 2
Proposers’ beliefs about whether the majority of Responders would accept (5,5) and (8,2) by
information condition and offer source.

Information Condition / Source
Full
From Coin
From choice
Private
Limited

Will the Majority of Responders accept?
(5,5)
(8,2)
Yes
No
Yes

No

32
32
32
31

7
16
15
9

0
0
0
0

25
15
17
22

Note. Three rows total less than 32 because of missing data due to clerical error.
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Table 3
Means (SEMs) for the Belief Data

Responders’
Empirical
Expectations
What % of Proposers will
choose (5,5)?
What % of Proposers will
choose (8,2)?
What % of Proposers will
choose Coin?
Fairness Beliefs
Is (8,2) a fair option?

Proposers
Full
Private

-

.09
(.05)
What % of Proposers said .27
(8,2) was a fair option?
(.05)
What % of Responders said .10
(8,2) was a fair option?
(.03)
Is Coin a fair option?
.81
(.07)
What % of Proposers said .85
Coin was a fair option?
(.04)
What % of Responders said .76
Coin was fair?
(.05)

Limited

Responders
Full
Private

Limited

-

-

.44
(.06)
.28
(.05)
.28
(.05)

.71
(.05)
.28
(.05)
-

.46
(.06)
.28
(.06)
.25
(.06)

.19
(.07)
.29
(.06)
.10
(.03)
-

.16
(.07)
.29
(.06)
.14
(.04)
.72
(.08)
.77
(.06)
.62
(.07)

.22
(.07)
.15
(.05)
.52
(.09)
.46
(.06)

.19
(.07)
.13
(.05)
-

.25
(.08)
.15
(.05)
.43
(.09)
.39
(.07)

Proposers’ ProfitMaximizing Beliefs
Will the majority of
.48
.53
.71
Responders accept (8,2) not (.09) (.09)
(.08)
resulting from Coin?
Will the majority of
.78
Responders accept (8,2)
(.07) resulting from Coin?
Note. The yes/no questions (“Is … a fair option?” and “Will the majority…?”) were dummy coded
as 1 (yes) or 0 (no); therefore, the means for these questions were the proportions of individuals
who answered yes.
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Table 4
Factor Loadings for Proposers’ Belief Data from a Four-Factor EFA
Variable

Factor 1: Factor 2: Fairness Factor 3: Profit Factor 4: Fairness of
Fairness of of Coin-Limited Maximization
Coin-Full
(8,2)

(8,2) is fair
Full
-0.28
-0.17
0.53
Private
0.96
Limited
0.14
0.93
% of Proposers who
said (8,2) is fair
Full
0.09
0.32
0.46
Private
0.36
-0.13
0.71
Limited
0.33
-0.12
-0.17
0.77
% of Responders who
said (8,2) is fair
Full
-0.11
0.17
0.43
Private
0.11
0.46
Limited
0.28
-0.19
0.61
Coin is fair
Full
0.14
0.76
Limited
0.11
0.79
% of Proposers who
said Coin is fair
Full
0.22
0.91
Limited
0.16
0.91
% of Responders who
said Coin is fair
Full
0.16
0.48
Limited
0.12
0.11
0.84
Majority of Responders
will accept (8,2)
Full
0.12
0.22
0.88
Full (from coin)
-0.24
0.66
Private
0.18
0.72
Limited
0.33
-0.44
0.66
Proportion Var.
0.23
0.16
0.13
0.12
Cumulative Var.
0.23
0.39
0.52
0.64
Corr. Scores
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.99
Note. Only loadings with a magnitude of at least 0.10 are shown. An oblimin rotation was applied.
Loadings used to interpret each factor are bolded.
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Table 5
Logit Coefficients of Factor Scores as Predictors of Proposers’ Choice, by Information Condition
Condition

Intercept Factor
1: Factor
2: Factor
3: Factor
4:
Fairness of Fairness
of Acceptability of Fairness of
(8,2)
Coin-Limited
(8,2)
Coin-Full

Full
(8,2) vs. (5,5) -2.40
1.37∙
3.26∙
*
Coin vs. (5,5) 0.33
0.20
1.38
Private
(8,2) vs. (5,5) -0.58
1.54*
0.83
Limited
(8,2) vs. (5,5) 0.07
0.97*
Coin vs. (5,5) -1.78*
0.39
∙
*
p < .10, p < .05.
Note. The factors to retain as predictors were chosen by minimizing AIC through stepwise
regression.

Table 6
Tabulation of Offer Patterns Across Conditions
Condition
Full Private Limited Count
8
(5,5) (5,5)
(5,5)
5
Coin (8,2)
(8,2)
4
Coin (5,5)
(5,5)
4
Coin (5,5)
(8,2)
3
(8,2) (8,2)
(8,2)
(5,5) (5,5)
Coin
2
(5,5) (8,2)
(8,2)
1
(5,5) (8,2)
Coin
1
(5,5) Coin
(5,5)
1
(5,5) Coin
(8,2)
1
(8,2) (8,2)
(5,5)
1
Coin Coin
(8,2)
1
Total
32
Note. The patterns we expected to observe are in boldface.
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